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QUESTION PRESENTED
Does the Suquamish Indian Tribe possess inherent sovereign power to exercise
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians alleged to have committed misdemeanor crimes
within the boundaries of the tribe's own reservation in violation of the Suquamish Law
and Order Code?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case addresses the inherent sovereign power of an Indian tribe to exercise
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians accused of committing crimes within the
boundaries of the tribe's own reservation. Respondent Mark David Oliphant, a nonIndian, was arrested by law enforcement officers of the Suquamish Indian Tribe for
allegedly physically assaulting a tribal police officer and resisting arrest during Chief
Seattle Days, a tribal festival conducted on the tribe's reservation, the Port Madison
Reservation. Respondent Daniel B. Belgarde, also a non-Indian, was arrested by
Suquamish tribal law enforcement officers after allegedly engaging in criminally
reckless and dangerous conduct by participating in a high-speed race along a
reservation highway that ended when Belgarde crashed his vehicle into a tribal police
vehicle. In separate proceedings the United States District Court for the Western
District of Washington denied both Respondents' habeas corpus petitions.
Subsequently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Court affirmed
the denial of habeas in Respondent Oliphant's case, holding that the Suquamish Tribe
retained inherent sovereign power to exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians
because no treaty or statute deprived the Tribe of such jurisdiction and because the
exercise of such authority was not in conflict with - and indeed was supported by policies of the United States.' Respondent Belgarde's appeal from the district court's
denial of habeas was pending before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
when the
2
United States Supreme Court granted writs of certiorari in both cases.
The United States Supreme Court reversed the dismissals of Oliphant's and
Belgarde's habeas petitions, holding that Indian tribes lack the inherent sovereign
power to try and to punish non-Indians who allegedly commit crimes within the
boundaries of the tribes' own reservations. 3 The Court based its ruling on judicial
assessment of tribes' "status" under United States law as informed by the Court's own
discernment of a historic "assumption," purportedly shared by all three branches of the
federal government, that Indian tribes lack inherent sovereign power to exercise
governing authority over on-reservation crimes committed by non-Indians.4 The Court
intimated further that its denial of the inherent sovereign authority of Indian tribes to
try and to punish non-Indians for on-reservation criminal activity was driven in part by
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the Court's belief that such governing authority conflicted with an overriding federal
interest in protecting
United States citizens "from unwarranted intrusions on their
5
personal liberty.",
The Suquamish Indian Tribe filed this timely request for review by the
Supreme Court of the American Indian Nations. The Supreme Court of the American
Indian Nations granted the Tribe's petition for review. The Tribe seeks this Court's
reversal of the United States Supreme Court's denial of the inherent sovereign power
of Indian tribes to exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians within the boundaries
of the tribes' own respective reservations.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Suquamish Indian Tribe has never relinquished its inherent sovereign
authority to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all persons within the boundaries of the
Port Madison Reservation, including non-Indians such as Respondents Oliphant and
Belgarde. Because there is no clear and unambiguous evidence that the Suquamish
Indian Tribe has been prohibited by treaty provision or congressional statute from
exercising its inherent sovereign power of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians
within reservation boundaries (as the U.S. Supreme Court below effectively conceded),
that power remains intact. The U.S. Supreme Court's erroneous invention and
application of a theory of "implicit divestiture" by which the Court licenses itselfindependent of any treaty provision or statute - to deem tribes' sovereign powers
"inherently lost" is an affront to longstanding, core principles of the field of Indian law
protective of tribes' sovereign governing authority. To restore stability, integrity, trust,
and honor to the federal-tribal relationship, the U.S. Supreme Court's Oliphant
decision must be overturned.
ARGUMENT
THE SUQUAMISH INDIAN TRIBE RETAINS AUTHORITY TO EXERCISE
CRIMINAL
JURISDICTION
OVER NON-INDIANS
WITHIN THE
BOUNDARIES OF THE TRIBE'S OWN RESERVATION BECAUSE THE
TRIBE HAS NEVER RELINQUISHED THIS AUTHORITY BY TREATY OR
OTHER BILATERAL CONSENSUAL AGREEMENT AND BECAUSE NO
CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMITTED UNILATERAL ACT OF CONGRESS
OR OVERRIDING NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY INTEREST OF THE
UNITED STATES PRECLUDES THE TRIBE FROM EXERCISING THIS
INHERENT SOVEREIGN POWER
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In denying the Suquamish Indian Tribe its authority to try and (if convicted) to
punish the non-Indian Respondents accused of committing crimes within the
boundaries of the Tribe's own reservation, the United States Supreme Court issued a
ruling at odds with core principles of federal Indian law protective of inherent tribal
sovereignty, principles that have been consistently embraced and acknowledged by the
Supreme Court in decisions dating to the Court's foundational Indian law cases of the
early nineteenth century. 6 The Supreme Court's decision below is equally
incompatible with current congressional policy supporting inherent tribal sovereignty
and self-determination. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court's creation and
deployment of what it terms an "implicit divestiture" rationale 7 for denying the
sovereign authority of Indian tribes in Indian country where the tribes have not
relinquished such authority and where Congress has not legislatively precluded it
jeopardizes the United States' regulation of Indian affairs by national deliberative
means, threatening to replace Congress's established, exclusive policymaking role in
Indian affairs with case-by-case policy predilections and ideological preferences of
unelected, politically unaccountable judges. Notwithstanding the U.S. Supreme
Court's assertions to the contrary, the history of relations between the United States
government and Indian nations evinces no "unspoken assumption" 8 that tribes lack the
inherent authority and right to safeguard themselves and their reserved territories by
exercising criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians who commit violent offenses within
the boundaries of Indian reservations. Nor is tribes' exercise of this inherent
prerogative of every sovereign to prohibit and punish criminal conduct within the
sovereign's own territory a threat to the federal government's national territorial
security or otherwise in conflict with "the overriding sovereignty of the United States" 9
so as to license judicial prohibitions on tribes' exercise of inherent sovereign powers of
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. The judicial denial of inherent tribal power in
this case is a dangerous aberration that undermines and destabilizes more than two
centuries of congressional legislation, treaties, and U.S. Supreme Court decisions in the
field of federal Indian law. To restore stability, integrity, trust, and honor to the
federal-tribal relationship, the U.S. Supreme Court's Oliphant decision must be
overturned.
I. THE SUQUAMISH INDIAN TRIBE POSSESSES THE INHERENT
SOVEREIGN POWER OF CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OVER NON-INDIANS
IN ACCORDANCE WITH GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL INDIAN
LAW PURSUANT TO WHICH AN INDIAN TRIBE RETAINS ALL THE
ORIGINAL INHERENT POWERS OF ANY SOVEREIGN NATION THAT
THE TRIBE HAS NOT VOLUNTARILY RELINQUISHED BY TREATY OR
OTHER BILATERAL CONSENSUAL AGREEMENT OR THAT CONGRESS
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HAS
NOT
CLEARLY
AND
UNAMBIGUOUSLY
PRECLUDED
UNILATERALLY BY MEANS OF CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMITTED
LEGISLATION
"Perhaps the most basic principle of all Indian law, supported by a host of
decisions, is that those powers that are lawfully vested in an Indian tribe are not, in
general, delegated powers granted by express acts of Congress, but rather 'inherent
powers of a limited sovereignty which has never been extinguished.""' 0 This statement
from the Cohen treatise of federal Indian law embodies the insight of the great scholar
Felix Cohen, who culled this crucial observation from a multitude of judicial opinions
in the course of drafting the watershed original edition of the Cohen Handbook.1"
Cohen elaborated on the nature of inherent tribal sovereignty within the historic
framework of federal Indian law:
Each Indian tribe begins its relationship with the Federal Government as
a sovereign power, recognized as such in treaty and legislation. The
powers of sovereignty have been limited from time to time by special
treaties and laws designed to take from the Indian tribes control of
matters which, in the judgment of Congress, these tribes could no longer
be safely permitted to handle. The statutes of Congress, then, must be
examined to determine the limitations of tribal sovereignty rather than
to determine its source or its positive content. What is not expressly
12
limited remains within the domain of tribalsovereignty.
The Cohen treatise's observation that Indian tribes retain all the inherent
"powers of sovereignty" except those that have been expressly precluded by treaty or
congressional statute comports with core principles of federal Indian law dating to the
foundational "Cherokee cases" of the 1830s. In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,13 the
U.S. Supreme Court held that the Cherokee Nation is not a "foreign state" within the
meaning of the United States Constitution's grant of original jurisdiction to the
Supreme Court over controversies "between a state . . . and foreign states."' 14 In an
often-cited opinion announcing the Court's judgment, Chief Justice John Marshall
explained that although the Cherokee Nation's unique "domestic dependent"
relationship, as an Indian tribe, with the United States government deprived the
Cherokee Nation of a "foreign" status for purposes of the Court's original jurisdiction
in state-foreign state diversity cases, a majority of the justices found "completely
successful" the Cherokee Nation's efforts "to prove [its] character ...as a state, as a
distinct political society, separated from others, capable of managing its own affairs
and governing itself."' 5
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Cherokee Nation's recognition of the sovereign status of Indian tribes under
United States law matured into a holding of the Court in Worcester v. Georgia,16 the
culminating case of the "Marshall trilogy" synthesizing all the decisions and distilling
the foundational principles of federal Indian law. In rebuffing efforts by the state of
Georgia to defy and obliterate the political existence of the Cherokee Nation and
distribute Cherokee lands, upon which gold had been discovered, to five Georgia
counties, the Supreme Court repeatedly emphasized Indian tribes' distinctive status as
nations, possessing, as such, plenary attributes of inherent national sovereignty,
acknowledged and protected under federal law:
The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent
political communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the
undisputed possessors of the soil, from time immemorial, with the
single exception of that imposed by irresistible power, which excluded
them from intercourse with any other European potentate than the first
discoverer of the coast of the particular region claimed: and this was a
restriction which the European potentates imposed upon themselves, as
well as on the Indians. The very term "nation," so generally applied to
them, means "a people distinct from others." The constitution, by
declaring treaties already made, as well as those to be made, to be the
supreme law of the land, has adopted and sanctioned the previous
treaties with the Indian nations, and consequently admits their rank
among those powers who are capable of making treaties. The words
"treaty" and "nation" are words of our own language, selected in our
diplomatic and legislative proceedings, by ourselves, having each a
definite and well understood meaning. We have applied them to
Indians, as we have applied them to the other nations of the earth. They
are applied to all in the same sense. 17
By virtue of its status as a tribal nation protected, as such, under paramount federal law
from all intrusions of state law, the Court held that
[t]he Cherokee nation . . . is a distinct community occupying its own
territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of
Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no
right to enter, but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves,
or in
18
conformity with treaties, and with the acts of Congress.
Of crucial significance to the present dispute between the Suquamish Indian
Tribe and the non-Indian Respondents is Worcester's prescription for construing

Petitioner's Brief
provisions of treaties and federal statutes purported to have the effect of diminishing
tribes' original national sovereignty. Writing for the Worcester Court, Chief Justice
Marshall rejected all efforts by the state of Georgia to persuade the Court to interpret
provisions of the 1785 Treaty of Hopewell and the 1791 Treaty of Holston as effecting
"a surrender of [the Cherokees'] national character."' 19 For instance, with respect to a
provision of the Treaty of Hopewell "acknowledg[ing] the Cherokees to be under the
protection of the United States of America, and of no other power," the Court observed
that, like similar provisions "found in Indian treaties generally," such language of
protection denoted only that
the strong hand of government was interposed to restrain the disorderly
and licentious from intrusions into their country, from encroachments
on their lands, and from those acts of violence which were often
attended by reciprocal murder. The Indians perceived in this protection
only what was beneficial to themselves - an engagement to punish
aggressions on them. It involved,
practically, no claim to their lands, no
20
dominion over their persons.
The Court concluded that, contrary to Georgia's arguments, the "protection" language
of the Treaty of Hopewell must be construed as preserving, not diminishing, "the
national character" of the Cherokee Nation: "The Cherokees acknowledge themselves
to be under the protection of the United States, and of no other power. Protection does
not imply the destruction of the protected.,21
Another important illustration of Worcester's implementation of a treaty
interpretation methodology that is highly protective of the original inherent sovereignty
of Indian tribes is the Court's response to Georgia's argument that by referring to the
Cherokee Nation's reserved territory as "[tihe boundary allotted to the Cherokees for
their hunting grounds," 22 the Treaty of Hopewell diminished the tribe's title and
sovereignty within the territory described.23 Rejecting Georgia's argument, the Court
instructed that a given term in an Indian treaty must be construed as the Indians would
have understood such language in view of "the whole transaction," even where the
disputed term otherwise would seem to "admit of no other signification" than the one
argued by the Indians' adversaries in the dispute:
Is it reasonable to suppose, that the Indians, who could not write, and
most probably could not read, who certainly were not critical judges of
our language, should distinguish the word "allotted" from the words
"marked out." The actual subject of contract was the dividing line
between the two nations; and their attention may very well be supposed
to have been confined to that subject. When, in fact, they were ceding
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lands to the United States, and describing the extent of their cession, it
may well be supposed that they might not understand the term
employed, as indicating that, instead of granting, they were receiving
lands. If the term would admit of no other signification, which is not
conceded, its being misunderstood is so apparent, results so necessarily
from the whole transaction; that it must, we think, be taken in the sense
in which it was most obviously used.
So with respect to the words "hunting grounds." Hunting was at
that time the principal occupation of the Indians, and their land was
more used for that purpose than for any other. It could not, however, be
supposed that any intention existed of restricting the full use of the
lands they reserved.

These terms had been used in their treaties with Great Britain, and
had never been misunderstood. They had never been supposed to imply
a right in the British government
to take their lands, or to interfere with
24
government.
internal
their
A third instructive example of Worcester's protection of tribal sovereignty
through its prescribed use of special rules of treaty and statutory construction is the
Court's explanation as to why a treaty provision acknowledging the United States
government's "sole and exclusive right of regulating the trade with the Indians, and
managing all their affairs in such manner as they think proper' ' 25 cannot be read as
impliedly divesting the tribe of any of it original inherent sovereign authority:
To construe the expression "managing all their affairs," into a surrender
of self-government, would be, we think, a perversion of their necessary
meaning, and a departure from the construction which has been
uniformly put on them. The great subject of the article is Indian trade.
The influence it gave, made it desirable that congress should possess it.
The commissioners brought forward the claim, with the profession that
their motive was "the benefit and comfort of the Indians, and the
prevention of injuries and oppression." This may be true, as respects
the regulation of their trade, and as respects the regulation of all affairs
connected with their trade, but cannot be true, as respects the
management of all their affairs. The most important of these, are the
cession of their lands, and security against intruders on them. Is it
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credible, that they should have considered themselves as surrendering to
the United States the right to dictate their future cessions, and the terms
on which they should be made? or to compel their submission to the
violence of disorderly and licentious intruders?
It is equally
inconceivable that they could have supposed themselves, by a phrase
thus slipped into an article, on another and most interesting subject, to
have divested themselves of the right of self-government on subjects not
connected with trade. Such a measure could not be "for their benefit
and comfort," or for "the prevention of injuries and oppression." Such a
construction would be inconsistent with the whole spirit of this and all
subsequent treaties . . . . It would convert a treaty of peace covertly into
an act, annihilating the political existence of one of the parties. Had
such a result been intended, it would have been openly avowed.26
Beginning with the Worcester decision, American courts over the ensuing 170
years have developed and implemented a series of special interpretive canons for
construing provisions of treaties, federal statutes, and other sources of positive law
arguably impacting the sovereignty and rights of Indian tribes and Indian people.
These special Indian law canons of construction include interpreting treaty provisions
27
to give effect to the terms as the Indians themselves would have understood them,
interpreting treaty provisions liberally in favor of the Indians, 28 and resolving all
ambiguities in the Indians' favor. 29 A crucial corollary principle of federal Indian law
reflected and manifested in these historic Indian law canons of construction and
frequently acknowledged by the United States Supreme Court is that ambiguous
provisions of federal law must be "construed generously in order to comport with...
traditional notions of [tribal] sovereignty and with the federal policy of encouraging
tribal independence." 30 Moreover, consistent with these longstanding interpretive rules
and principles of federal Indian law, the Supreme Court has instructed that with respect
to judicial decisionmaking in the present era of congressional support for tribal
sovereignty and self-determination, the courts "will not strain to implement [a] policy
that Congress has now rejected, particularly where to do so will interfere31with the
present congressional approach to what is, after all, an ongoing relationship."
In its holding and analysis in the present dispute denying the Suquamish Indian
Tribe's inherent sovereign authority to exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians,
the U.S. Supreme Court has rendered a decision at war with all these time-honored
interpretive rules and principles protective of tribal sovereignty and Indian rights.
Disregarding every principled judicial directive admonishing courts to find a
diminishment of the original sovereign powers of Indian tribes only upon clear
indications that Congress intended to produce such a diminishment, the Court instead
purported to divine a historic "unspoken assumption," shared by all three branches of
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the federal government, that Indian tribes lack inherent authority, as governmental
sovereigns, to exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. 32 For a number of
reasons, the aberrant, deeply flawed interpretive methodology fashioned by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Oliphant must be rejected and the field of Indian law thereby
restored to its pre-Oliphant posture broadly supporting tribal sovereignty in the
absence of deliberate limiting action by Congress.
It should be noted at the outset that in simultaneously devising and deploying
its "unspoken assumption" methodology, the Supreme Court in Oliphant appears to
concede the novelty of this unprecedented judicial device for ascertaining the effect of
sources of positive law on the inherent sovereign authority of Indian tribes. Thus,
while admitting that the isolated instances of federal action (and non-action) it analyzes
ultimately "would probably not be sufficient to remove criminal jurisdiction over nonIndians if the Tribe otherwise retained such jurisdiction," 33 the Court also inexplicably
portrays its denial of tribal authority as simply the product of statutory construction,
insisting that the Court "now make[s] express our implicit conclusion of nearly a
century ago that Congress believed [preclusion of tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonIndians] to be the necessary result of its repeated legislative action." 34 The Supreme
Court's equivocating statements as to whether Oliphant is based on statutory
construction betrays the Court's own underlying ambivalence about the integrity of its
legal reasoning and the credibility of its decision in the face of all the Court's previous
countervailing decisions supporting inherent tribal sovereignty.
This ambivalence is understandable, for the Supreme Court's Oliphant decision
has been sharply criticized as a travesty of judicial lawmaking in disregard of settled,
time-honored methodologies of construction in the field of Indian law. 35 The
avalanche of criticism unloosed by Oliphant has generated numerous compelling
analyses by legal scholars carefully explaining, inter alia, why the Court's alleged
discernment of an "unspoken assumption," purported to be shared by all three branches
of the federal government, that tribes lack inherent criminal jurisdiction over nonIndians is in fact completely without merit. In the present dispute, the Supreme Court
ultimately conceded that the sources it relied on in this part of the Oliphant opinion
"would probably not be sufficient to remove criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians if
the Tribe otherwise retained such jurisdiction. 36 Because of this concession, and
because detailed scholarly critiques of these dubious sources are readily available
elsewhere, 37 those detailed analyses need not be repeated here.
For present purposes it is sufficient to observe that in the Oliphant Court's
invocation of all these dubious sources - selected treaty language, federal criminal
jurisdiction statutes silent on tribal jurisdiction, doubtful opinions of attorneys general
issued in 1834 and 1856, defeated congressional bills, legislative reports, dictum from
an 1878 federal district court opinion, and a withdrawn 1970 opinion of the Solicitor of
the Department of the Interior 38 - the Court steadfastly refused to conduct its inquiry
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into the alleged impact on tribal authority of these sundry fragments of law (and
nonlaw) in accordance with the Indian law canons as derived from the foundational
cases of the field. Despite longstanding Indian law principles mandating that tribal
powers be judicially upheld in the absence of clear, countermanding legislation or
treaty language, the Oliphant Court strained to interpret every fragment under its
inspection as evincing - "beyond [its] actual text ' 39 - an "unspoken assumption" in
derogation of Indian tribes' criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. There simply is no
precedent for an interpretive methodology in the field of Indian law that is as hostile to
the sovereignty of Indian tribes and as evasive of the field's foundational principles as
the methodology devised and employed in Oliphant.
The ubiquitous criticisms of Oliphant's interpretive methodology are well
founded. The sources relied on by the Court in divining an "unspoken assumption"
that tribes lack criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians do not exhibit any clear and
unambiguous preclusion of tribes' exercise of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians,
as the foundational principles of Indian law require and as the Oliphant Court
effectively conceded. There is no evidence, moreover, that the Suquamish Indian
Tribe has ever voluntarily relinquished its pre-existing sovereign authority over the
criminal behavior of non-Indians within the boundaries of the Port Madison
Reservation. The Suquamish Tribe's inherent sovereign authority to try and to punish
Respondents Oliphant and Belgarde therefore remains intact.
INDIAN TRIBE'S RETAINED INHERENT
II. THE SUQUAMISH
SOVEREIGN AUTHORITY TO EXERCISE CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
OVER NON-INDIANS WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES OF THE SUQAUMISH
RESERVATION IS NOT "IMPLICITLY DIVESTED" BECAUSE THE
TRIBE'S EXERCISE OF THIS AUTHORITY DOES NOT THREATEN THE
UNITED STATES' TERRITORIAL SECURITY AND HENCE DOES NOT
CONFLICT WITH THE "OVERRIDING SOVEREIGNTY OF THE
UNITED STATES"
While most of the United States Supreme Court's majority opinion in Oliphant
endeavors to persuade readers that prohibiting Indian tribes from exercising criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians comports with a historic "unspoken assumption" by the
federal government that tribes lack such authority, 40 the Court conceded in Part II of its
opinion that this "assumption" alone would be insufficient to compel the conclusion
that the Suquamish Tribe lacked inherent sovereign power to try and to punish nonIndian criminal defendants like Respondents Oliphant and Belgarde. 4 ' Rather, the
Court stated that this "assumption" merely "carrie[d] considerable weight"42 in the
Court's independent determination to effectively impose a judicial prohibition of the
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Court's own making on tribes' exercise of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. As
elaborated previously, 43 the Court erred in ascertaining the existence of this purported
"unspoken assumption," and hence such "assumption" cannot "carr[y] considerable
weight" with respect to any sound and principled judicial inquiry into whether Indian
tribes retain inherent sovereign authority to exercise criminal jurisdiction over nonIndians within the tribes' own respective reservations. However, quite apart from the
Court's egregiously flawed handling of the issue of congressional intent, it is
Oliphant's creation of an unprecedented judicial mechanism for curtailing inherent
tribal powers in the absence of treaty or statutory limitations that has had the most
deleterious impact on longstanding doctrines of Indian law protective of tribal
sovereignty and self-government within reservation boundaries. 44 Oliphant's invention
and application of this repressive judicial device - which the Court subsequently
termed its "implicit divestiture" rationale 45 - derives from demonstrably unsound
judicial reasoning and produces a result that is unjust and an affront to longstanding
doctrinal traditions of federal Indian law broadly supporting the inherent sovereign
powers of Indian nations. The Supreme Court's Oliphant decision therefore must be
overturned.
In licensing itself to find a diminishment of inherent tribal sovereignty in the
absence of treaty or statutory limitations, the U.S. Supreme Court below purported to
rely on three decisions of the John Marshall Supreme Court of the early 1800s Fletcher v. Peck,46 Johnson v. M'Intosh,4 7 and Cherokee Nation v. Georgia.48 With
respect to each of these early cases Oliphant's reliance is misplaced. In Johnson v.
M'Intosh - a case that forms part of the "Marshall trilogy" of foundational Indian law
cases, together with Cherokee Nation and Worcester v. Georgia49 - the Court held
that the non-Indian plaintiffs' alleged acquisition of title to Indian land through
purchase directly from Indian tribes without Congress' legislative authorization is not
cognizable in the federal courts.50 The Court discussed at length the history of
relations between Indian tribes and colonizing nations, including the United States, as
that history shed light on the issue of the alienability of lands in the possession of the
tribes but "discovered" by the colonizing nations. 51 In the Court's view, this history
exhibited an operant principle of "discovery" informing relations between Indian tribes
and colonizing powers, a principle which "gave the nation making the discovery the
52
sole right of acquiring the soil from the natives, and establishing settlements upon it."
Because each colonizing sovereign had, in the first instance, "the sole right" to
purchase tribal lands, citizens or subjects of that sovereign had no "right" to acquire
title to such lands without first securing an affirmative grant of such "right" from the
"discovering" sovereign. As stated by the Court, the existence of the United States'
exclusive power to grant rights to acquire tribal lands
"must negative the existence of
53
it."
control
and
with,
conflict
any right which may

Petitioner's Brief
The Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. M'Intosh thus rests primarily on
the preclusive effect of the United States government's "discovery"-based title to
tribally occupied lands on claims of right under federal law asserted by the putative
purchasers of those lands. However, the Court's opinion also addresses a collateral
preclusion on the federally cognizable rights of the would-be sellers of those lands, i.e.,
the Indian tribes themselves:
In the establishment of these relations [between the discoverer and the
natives], the rights of the original inhabitants were, in no instance,
entirely disregarded; but they were necessarily, to a considerable extent,
impaired. They were admitted to be the rightful occupants of the soil,
with a legal as well as just claim to retain possession of it, and use it
according to their own discretion; but their rights to complete
sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily diminished, and
their power to dispose of the soil at their own will, to whomsoever they
principle, that
pleased, was denied by the original fundamental
54
discovery gave exclusive title to those who made it.
In the M'Intosh Court's view, the existence of the United States' "discovery"-based
title to tribal lands meant that neither the purchase nor the sale of tribal lands without
55
affirmative congressional authorization could be acknowledged by the federal courts.
As a matter of federal law, then, Indian tribes' "rights to complete sovereignty ...were
necessarily diminished," for the federal government's "discovery"-based title to the
tribes' own lands was "incompatible with an absolute and complete title in the
Indians. ' 56
In its majority opinion in the present dispute, the U.S. Supreme Court distorted
and misrepresented the Marshall Court's carefully elaborated reasoning for finding
Indian tribes' power to alienate their own lands precluded in Johnson v. M'Intosh,
erroneously portraying that precedent as authorizing the judiciary to proclaim, on a
case-by-case basis, "inherent limitations on tribal powers that stem from their
incorporation into the United States."57 Far from viewing tribes' "incorporation into
the United States" as the proper starting-point for determining whether tribal powers
58
continue to exist, M'Intosh expressly denies that tribes ever had been "incorporated.,
Wielding this "incorporation" fiction as a subterfuge, the Oliphant Court ignored
M'Intosh's numerous invocations of positive law as the Marshall Court's true startingpoint for ascertaining the preclusive effect of the United States' "discovery"-based title
on the sovereign powers of Indian tribes as recognized under federal law. 59 As one
commentator aptly has noted, at the hands of the Oliphant Court Johnson v. M'Intosh
"underwent a forced metamorphosis into its opposite," with the Court invoking the
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Indian law precedent "to support what it exactly and
name of that foundational
60
repudiates."
expressly
It should be noted, moreover, that within a decade of issuing its decision in
Johnson v. M'Intosh, the Marshall Court rendered another, more comprehensive
decision concerning the retained inherent sovereignty and federally protected rights of
Indian tribes that appears to alter that portion of M'Intosh's rationale which suggested
a limitation on the power of tribes to sell their lands. In Worcester v. Georgia6 1 the
Court clarified that the "discovery" principle - a principle "which all [the nations of
Europe] would acknowledge, and which should decide their respective rights as
between themselves" 62 - did not restrict the rights of the tribes:
This principle, acknowledged by all Europeans, because it was the
interest of all to acknowledge it, gave to the nation making the
discovery, as its inevitable consequence, the sole right of acquiring the
soil and making settlements on it. It was an exclusive principle which
shut out the right of competition among those who had agreed to it; not
one which could annul the previous rights of those who had not agreed
to it. It regulated the right given by discovery among the European
discoverers; but could not affect the rights of those already in
possession, either as aboriginal occupants, or as occupants by virtue of a
discovery made before the memory of man. It gave the exclusive right
to the purchaser, but 63did not found that right on a denial of the right of
the possessor to sell.
Worcester's clarification concerning the "discovery" principle's limited scope of
operation casts considerable additional doubt on the Oliphant Court's portrayal
' 64 of
Johnson v. M'Intosh as having effected an "inherent limitation[ ] on tribal powers.
Purporting to rely on another influential early decision of the John Marshall
Supreme Court, the Oliphant majority likewise distorted and misrepresented the 1810
case of Fletcher v. Peck.65 Labeling Fletcher as "the first case to reach this Court
dealing with the status of Indian tribes," the Oliphant Court wrote:
Mr. Justice Johnson in a separate concurrence summarized the nature of
the limitations inherently flowing from the overriding sovereignty of the
United States as follows: "[T]he restrictions upon the right of soil in the
Indians, amount . . . to an exclusion of all competitors [to the
United States] from their markets; and the limitation upon their
right of governing every person within their
sovereignty amounts to the
66
limits except themselves."

Petitioner's Brief
This asserted reliance on Justice Johnson's commentary in Fletcher v. Peck to
support Oliphant's denial of tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians exhibits
several serious errors of analysis. First, the Oliphant Court erred in aggrandizing
Justice Johnson's remarks by misleadingly referring to them as constituting a
"concurrence." Indeed, Justice Johnson conceded that his viewpoint amounted to a
dissenting position relative to that of the Fletcher Court majority, observing that his
commentary on the nature and extent of state property interests in Indian lands (which
the Oliphant excerpt misrepresents) 67 was a "point on which I dissent from the opinion
of the court." 68 Oliphant's false labeling of Justice Johnson's remarks in Fletcher as a
'"concurrence" is an especially corrosive error in view of the numerous subsequent
instances in which the Supreme Court has repeated that false characterization in
purporting to forge a link between its own imposition of judicially created limitations
69
on tribal sovereignty and the early decisions of the John Marshall Court.
A second, more troubling error regarding Oliphant's appropriation of Justice
Johnson's opinion in Fletcher v. Peck is the Court's inventive distortion of the
substance of Johnson's commentary. Notwithstanding Oliphant's misleading use of
alterations and omissions to posit an out-of-context misrepresentation of Justice
Johnson's views, when read in the broader context of his full separate opinion
Johnson's reference to "the right of governing every person within [the Indians'] limits
except themselves" 70 is revealed to be a statement about the limited nature of state
power in Indian country, not tribal power as falsely depicted by the Oliphant majority.
A closer, contextual examination of Justice Johnson's commentary thus is crucial for
appreciating the egregiousness of the Court's misplaced reliance on that commentary
for stripping Indian tribes of their inherent sovereign criminal jurisdiction over nonIndians.
As Justice Johnson explained, his dissenting commentary in Fletcher v. Peck
concerning the nature and extent of state property interests in tribal lands was put
forward to "entertain... an opinion different from that which has been delivered by
the court." 71 In particular, Justice Johnson dissented from the Court's conclusion that
"the nature of the Indian title ... is not such as to be absolutely repugnant to seisin in
fee on the part of the state.' 72 Positing that the "[t]he correctness of this opinion will
depend on a just view of the state of the Indian nations," Justice Johnson elaborated:
[I]f the Indian nations be the absolute proprietors of their soil, no other
nation can be said to have the same interest in it. What, then,
practically, is the interest of the states in the soil of the Indians within
their boundaries? Unaffected by particular treaties, it is nothing more
than what was assumed at the first settlement of the country, to wit, a
right of conquest or of purchase, exclusive of all competitors within
certain defined limits. All the restrictions upon the right of soil in the
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Indians, amount only to an exclusion of all competitors from their
markets; and the limitation upon their sovereignty amounts to the right
of governing every person within their limits except themselves. If the
interest in Georgia was nothing more than a pre-emptive right, how
could that be called a fee-simple, which was nothing more than a power
to acquire a fee-simple by purchase, when the proprietors should be
pleased to sell? And, if this ever was any thing more than a mere
possibility, it certainly was reduced to that state when Georgia ceded, to
the United States, by the constitution, both the power of pre-emption
and of conquest, retaining for itself only a resulting right dependent on a
purchase or conquest to be made by the United States.
There is, admittedly, some ambiguity in Justice Johnson's reference to "the
right of governing every person within their limits except themselves. ' 74 However,
when viewed in the broader context of his disagreement with the Court's determination
that Georgia had a fee simple ownership interest in Indian lands (albeit an interest
encumbered by Indian title), Justice Johnson in this passage most likely was merely
suggesting that tribal self-government collaterally limits state power in Indian country,
just as Indian title collaterally limits state property interests in Indian lands. This
reading is supported by Justice Johnson's prior, parallel assertion that "[w]e legislate
upon the conduct of strangers or citizens within their limits, but innumerable treaties
formed with them acknowledge them to be an independent people, and the uniform
practice of acknowledging their right of soil, by purchasing from them, and restraining
all persons from encroaching upon their territory, makes it unnecessary to insist upon
their right of soil.75
The Supreme Court majority in Oliphant deliberately obscured this reading,
however, by altering the sentence it extracted from Justice Johnson's opinion in
Fletcher v. Peck, replacing the word "only" with an ellipsis and inserting the phrase "to
the United States":
[T]he restrictions upon the right of soil in the Indians, amount. . . to an
exclusion of all competitors [to the United States] from their markets;
right of
and the limitation upon their sovereignty amounts to the
76
governing every person within their limits except themselves.
This altered version suggests, erroneously (via the Court's insertion of the bracketed
phrase "to the United States"), that the sentence addresses federal proprietary interests
and sovereign authority in Indian country rather than the limited interests and authority
of the states prior to the establishment of the federal government under the
Constitution." Semantically, Oliphant's misleading insertion of the bracketed phrase
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"to the United States" in its altered version of Justice Johnson's original sentence tends
to strip that sentence of an ambiguity that, viewed in the original, unaltered context of
an argument asserting a limitation on states' property interests in Indian lands, is most
sensibly resolved by reading the statement as asserting a parallel limitation on the
states' - not the tribes' - governing authority in Indian country. In Justice
Johnson's view, it was the sovereignty of the states that was necessarily restricted by reason of the Indian tribes' pre-existing rights of self-government - to "the right of
78
governing everyone in [the Indians'] limits except [the Indians] themselves."
The Oliphant Court thus erred in forcing a revised reading of the statement it
excerpted and edited from Justice Johnson's separate opinion in Fletcher v. Peck, a
statement that appears in its original context as part of a broader argument insisting
that that the proprietary interests and sovereign governing authority of the states in
Indian country are necessarily limited. Invoking its altered rendition of Justice
Johnson's position in Fletcher therefore lends no legitimate support to the Court's
unavailing efforts to harmonize its decision to deprive Indian tribes of criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians with the foundational Indian law decisions of the
Marshall Court. Indeed, the Court's Oliphant decision is at war with those
foundational precedents.
Ironically, this tension between Oliphant's view of tribal sovereignty and that
of the Marshall Court is underscored by noting the incompatibility between the
deterioration in Justice Johnson's subsequent regard for tribal sovereignty in Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia79 - a deterioration not unlike that manifested in Oliphant itself and the increasingly expansive and protective view of tribal sovereignty as articulated
80
by Chief Justice John Marshall in both Cherokee Nation and Worcester v. Georgia.
In his separate opinion in Cherokee Nation, Justice Johnson's derogatory view of the
sovereignty of Indian nations is abundantly evident. Dismissing tribes as "hunter
horde[s]" and as "wandering hordes, held together only by ties of blood and habit, and
8
having neither laws or government, beyond what is required in a savage state,, '
Johnson wrote:
I cannot but think that there are strong reasons for doubting the
applicability of the epithet state, to a people so low in the grade of
organized society as our Indian tribes generally are. ...

There is one consequence that would necessarily flow from the
recognition of this people as a state, which of itself must operate greatly
against its admission.
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Where is the rule to stop? Must every petty kraal of Indians,
designating themselves a tribe or a nation, and having a few hundred
acres of land to hunt on exclusively, be recognized as a state? We
would indeed force into s2the family of nations, a very numerous and very
heterogeneous progeny.
Contrasting sharply with Justice Johnson's views, Chief Justice Marshall in
Cherokee Nation explained that "[s]o much of the [Cherokees'] argument as was
intended to prove the character of the Cherokees as a state, as a distinct political
society, separated from others, capable of managing its own affairs and goveming
itself, has, in the opinion of the majority of the judges, been completely successful."8
In Worcester, the Marshall Court majority went even farther in effectively denouncing
the denigrated view of tribal sovereignty pressed by Justice Johnson in Cherokee
Nation, squarely affirming that "[w]e have applied [the words 'treaty' and 'nation'] to
the Indians, as we have applied them to the other nations of the earth. They are applied
to all in the same sense. ' 84 These affirmations of tribal sovereignty from the majority
of justices in Cherokee Nation and Worcester demonstrate that to the extent Oliphant
signals the Court's inclination to embrace Justice Johnson's derogatory view of tribal
sovereignty as articulated in Cherokee Nation, that judicial choice is entirely at odds
with the foundational Indian law decisions of the Marshall Court.
The Oliphant Court's reliance on dictum from Chief Justice Marshall's
principal opinion in Cherokee Nation is likewise flawed. The Court asserted its
reliance as follows:
[I]n Cherokee Nation v. Georgia ...the Chief Justice observed that
since Indian tribes are "completely under the sovereignty and dominion
of the United States, ...any attempt [by foreign nations] to acquire
their lands, or to form a political connexion with them, would be
considered85 by all as an invasion of our territory, and an act of
hostility.
As in its discussion of Johnson v. M'Intosh, Oliphant here portrays the quoted
fragment from Cherokee Nation as reflecting another "inherent limitation[ ] on tribal
powers stemming from their incorporation into the United States," 86 presumably
recognized as such by the Marshall Court. On closer examination, however, it is
apparent that Chief Justice Marshall advanced this observation not to denigrate
inherent tribal sovereignty, but simply "to support the opinion, that the framers of the
constitution had not the Indian tribes in view, when they opened the courts of the union
to controversies between a state ...and foreign states." 8" In any event, to the extent
the fragment Oliphant extracts from Cherokee Nation reflects a prohibition on the
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exercise of inherent tribal powers, in terms of its import that prohibition does not stand
apart from the one concerning the alienability of tribal lands, discussed previously.
Both are simply aspects of what Worcester identifies as "the single exception" to the
federal government's acknowledgment of tribes' continuing retention of "their original
natural rights" 88 - an exception "imposed by irresistible power ' 89 and necessarily
implied in the multiple sources of positive law, addressed in Johnson v. M'Intosh, that
mediated the relationship between Indian tribes and the United States and, earlier,
90
between Indian tribes and Great Britain.
For the Marshall Court this "single exception" to the federal courts' affirmation
of Indian tribes' inherent sovereign authority amounted to a preclusion of any exercise
of tribal power that undermined or threatened the territorial security of the
United States. As Professor David Getches explains, at the time the Marshall decisions
were rendered "the possibility that Indians would convey land to foreign nations or
subjects formed a palpable threat to the integrity of the young nation." 91 This concern
about tribes conveying their lands to foreign nations via international agreements is
clearly manifested in the Marshall Court's analysis of the historic sources of law
regulating the relationship between tribal nations and "discovering" nations. For
instance, in Worcester, the Court observed:
Certain it is, that our history furnishes no example, from the first
settlement of our country, of any attempt on the part of the crown to
interfere with the internal affairs of the Indians, farther than to keep out
the agents of foreign powers, who, as traders or otherwise, might seduce
92
them into foreign alliances.
The Marshall Court's dictum in Cherokee Nation, quoted in Oliphant, hence does not
signify a judicial disparagement of inherent tribal sovereignty, as suggested by the
Oliphant Court. Rather, that dictum merely reflects the Marshall Court's deference to
prohibitions on alliances between tribes and foreign nations based on concerns about
national territorial security and emanating from the historical operation of positive law.
The Supreme Court's decision in Oliphant to deprive Indian tribes of their
inherent sovereign power to exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians thus finds
no support in the foundational Indian law decisions of the John Marshall Supreme
Court. The Marshall Court decisions simply do not countenance judicial adventurism
in independently prohibiting tribes "from exercising ... those powers [of autonomous
states that are] 'inconsistent with their status."' 93 Indeed, the Supreme Court has
forced a construction of the phrase "inconsistent with their status" that is contrary to
the meaning intended by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in
coining the phrase, for the appellate court's citation to particular passages from
Worcester and Cherokee Nation, together with the appellate court's conclusion that
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tribes retain their inherent sovereign authority to try and to punish non-Indians, make
clear that the tribes' dependent status does not effect any destruction of the tribes'
original sovereign powers. 94 The Oliphant Court's insistence that Indian tribes' ability
to impose criminal penalties on non-Indians is "inherently lost" 95 because of "the
96
tribes' forfeiture of full sovereignty in return for the protection of the United States"
defies the letter, spirit, and clear trajectory of the foundational Indian law decisions as
well as the whole course of Indian law jurisprudence predating the Oliphant decision
itself.97
In the final analysis, the U.S. Supreme Court in Oliphant opined that Indian
tribes are "implicitly divested" of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians because of the
federal government's "great solicitude that its citizens be protected by the
United States from unwarranted intrusions on their personal liberty." 98 ."By submitting
to the overriding sovereignty of the United States," the Court asserted, "Indian tribes..
•necessarily give up their power to try non-Indian citizens of the United States except
in a manner acceptable to Congress."99 At the time the Oliphant case was litigated,
Congress had, of course, enacted the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA), °° thereby
instituting numerous substantive protections for criminal defendants like Respondents
Oliphant and Belgarde vis-A-vis tribal court proceedings. As Professor Robert
Laurence observes, the Oliphant Court simply failed to "explain why Suquamish
10
conforming with the ICRA was not precisely the 'manner acceptable to Congress.' '
Professor Bruce Duthu elaborates on the unsettling implications of this judicial failure:
Oliphant's obvious concern for the protection of individual liberty rights
fails to consider that Congress may have taken that matter into account
when it passed the Indian Civil Rights Act. From this perspective, the
Court's interpretive function involved reconsidering legislative intent
and reordering the resulting political
dynamic - a function outside the
0 2
traditional role of the judiciary.1
More fundamentally, by equating the United States' supposed "great
solicitude" in protecting non-Indians from "unwarranted intrusions on their personal
liberty" with "[p]rotection of territory within [the United States'] external
boundaries,"1 0 3 the Oliphant Court effectively subverted Worcester's teaching that
there exists but a "single exception" to federal acknowledgment of tribes' retention of
their original inherent sovereignty.104 In so doing, "the Court reopened a category of
diminished tribal authority that had been thought closed forever by the Marshall
Court."'10 5 Notwithstanding Oliphant's invocation of its supposed "great solicitude"
rationale, the Court's defiance of the foundational principles of Indian law in stripping
tribes of their inherent criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians clearly lacks persuasive
justification. As Professor Getches points out,
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The potential for individual violations of civil liberties by tribes was not
then [in Chief Justice John Marshall's time] and is not now a similar
threat to national security [compared with the possibility that Indians
would convey land to foreign nations or subjects]. Furthermore, the
suggestion that tribal exercise of criminal jurisdiction will subject nonIndian defendants to unfair process is unsupported by the facts. 106
In theory, of course, the notion that the judiciary is precluded from
acknowledging exercises of tribal authority that conflict with "the overriding
sovereignty of the United States"' 0 7 might be regarded as merely the modem-day
equivalent of the Marshall Court's view that courts are precluded from acknowledging
exercises of tribal power that jeopardize the United States' national territorial security
- a contemporary restatement of "the single exception" to the courts' plenary
recognition and protection of tribes' original sovereign powers, as noted in
Worcester.
A sound and principled judicial analysis of the issue of tribal authority
in the present dispute thus would conclude that the Suquamish Indian Tribe's exercise
of criminal jurisdiction (as delimited by the Indian Civil Rights Act) over non-Indians
like Respondents Oliphant and Belgarde does not conflict with the United States'
"overriding sovereignty" precisely because (1) Congress has not expressly prohibited
tribes from exercising such authority and (2) tribes' exercise of this authority does not
threaten the national territorial security of the United States. Unfortunately, the U.S.
Supreme Court's Oliphant decision demonstrates that the "overriding sovereignty"
rubric in fact is vulnerable to judicial abuse; for in Oliphant itself the Court wielded
that rubric in an aggressive manner never before contemplated by the federal judiciary,
defying longstanding foundational principles of federal Indian law protective of tribes'
original sovereign powers. Far from exhibiting consistency with prior Supreme Court
jurisprudence protective of tribal powers, "Oliphant is perhaps the most dangerous
threat to tribal sovereignty of the [Court's] recent cases, as it completely distorts the
10 9
logic of tribal sovereignty."'
Because the Suquamish Tribe's exercise of criminal jurisdiction over
Respondents Oliphant and Belgarde is not in conflict with "the overriding sovereignty
of the United States""I10 as properly understood in view of the foundational principles
of Indian law, the Supreme Court of the American Indian Nations should uphold the
Tribe's sovereign authority by reversing the United States Supreme Court's contrary
ruling below. As a result of Oliphant and the subsequent Supreme Court cases decided
under its influence,"' "[tihe ongoing colonization of the continent now includes a
judicial role . . . , adjudicating the depreciated status of tribal authority on a case-bycase basis."1 2 Overturning the Supreme Court's Oliphant decision is the necessary

LaVelle
first step in the long journey toward restoring honor, respect, and trust to the historic
and ongoing relationship between Indian tribes and the United States government.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Suquamish Indian Tribe requests that the
Supreme Court of the American Indian Nations reverse the decision of the
United States Supreme Court, below, and thereby restore plenary federal recognition of
Indian tribes' inherent sovereign power to exercise criminal jurisdiction over nonIndians.
Respectfully submitted,
John P. LaVelle
Counsel for Petitioner
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Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 559.
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taking its protection.").
Oliphant,435 U.S. at 209.
Id. at 211.
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Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210.
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25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303.
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[ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in] 1868").
Oliphant,435 U.S. at 210.
See 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 559.
Anthony G. Gulig & Sidney L. Haring, "An Indian Cannot Get a Morsel of Pork....": A
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Indian Legal History, 38 TULSA L. REv. 87 108-09 (2002); see also Duthu, supra note 64, at 353
("The Court [in its treatment of tribal powers beginning with Oliphant] has substantially diluted the
theory and substance of tribal sovereignty formulated in the early days of the republic.").
Oliphant,435 U.S. at 210.
E.g. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001); Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 650
(2001); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997); Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990)
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Frickey, supra note 105, at 37.

